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INTER-ORGANIZATION REPORT ON THE SOURCE INFORMATION IN THE AREA, Dr. Klaus

This report contains information on the organization of the German Intelligence Service in Northern Italy and in the area of the German Intelligence Service.

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Organization "A" - "B" [ORG. CHARTS - IN THE AREA]  
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6 May 45

Major, I.O.  
CC Army Section,  
GSDIC, C.M.F.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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VAR 2. 2781  
6 MAY 45

(a) Personal Details

Name: Dr. E. (Er) Kline  
 Alias: None  
 Rank: SS Sturmbannführer  
 Unit: SS Sturmbannführer  
 SS No.: 111,445  
 Party No.: 5,407,445  
 Date of Birth: 1903  
 Date of Capture: 1945  
 Secret No.: 111,445  
 Interrogated: 6.5.45

(b) History and Career

Source was born on 30 Jan 12 in REIBURG in REIBURG as the son of a lawyer. He visited elementary and secondary schools at REIBURG and REIBURG and studied law at the universities of REIBURG and REIBURG. In 1937 he took his degree at the latter university and joined the German civil service. In 1938 he was appointed...

At the time of the outbreak of war Source held the appointment of Sturmbannführer in the SS. Having already reached the rank of Sturmbannführer in the SS, he was called up for duty with the SS Leibschmitt STURMGART (then SS Leibschmitt Sturmbatt) and posted to Stettin in Sep 39. His work there consisted of organising the processing of data into SWITZERLAND.

In Dec 39 he was recalled to the civil service and returned to his former post at KOTTBUS. In Jun 40 he was called up to the SS and posted to an SS in REIBURG. After three weeks service he received an injury to his arm and was subsequently invalided out of the SS.

In Jul 40 he was promoted Untersturmbannführer and sent back to the SS Leibschmitt STURMGART, where after a few weeks he was given charge of the SS. In Apr 42 he was promoted Sturmbannführer and in Nov 42 Sturmbannführer. In Apr 43 he was transferred to the SS and in Jun 43 reached the rank of Sturmbannführer. In Dec 44 he left the SS to take charge of the SS of the SS Leibschmitt STURMGART and he held this appointment until his capture.

*See Capt. Kline's (document) captures Kottbus details in Kottbus.*

(c) Assessment

Source is pleasant and intelligent and fully cooperative. He expressed anti-Nazi sentiments which are not thought to be entirely insincere. However, a sense of guilt and fear of the consequences of his long association with the SS and SS, have undoubtedly helped to bring about his present attitude.

Reliability: Good

(Interrogated by B.L.)

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SS AND SD IN REIBURG ITALY (Apr 45)

(a) The Higher SS and Police Organization

The territory under the jurisdiction of the Highest SS and Police Leader in ITALY, includes territories belonging to or annexed by GERMANY. As a result of this, part of the SS and SD organizations are run on the lines found in GERMANY proper, whereas others are organized on the lines used for SS and SD in occupied countries. In the case of ITALY another complication arises in that part of the territory, i.e. REIBURG and REIBURG came under the administration of REIBURG, whereas parts of REIBURG and the REIBURG REIBURG came under REIBURG. Consequently the area was split...

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between three SS and Polizeifuehrer and one Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer who are all responsible to the Hoehste SS und Polizeifuehrer.

The Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer was given the territory of the ADRIATISCHES KUESTENLAND and OBERTIROL and his own Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD and a Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei. The SS und Polizeifuehrer, however, do not command corresponding organizations but merely assist the Hoehste SS und Polizeifuehrer. Source pointed out that the responsibilities of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD, of the Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei and of the Befehlshaber der Waffen SS in the area were in no way affected by the introduction of three SS und Polizeifuehrer, and the former three continued to remain responsible directly to the Hoehste SS und Polizeifuehrer. In the case of the corresponding commands under the Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer ADRIATISCHES KUESTENLAND, close liaison with the respective organizations in ITALY was maintained. The responsibilities of the Befehlshaber der Waffen SS also included supervision of Italian SS units and formations. Finally Source stated that the territory of TIROL - VOERARBERG was recently taken away from the jurisdiction of the Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer in Tirolkreis XVIII to avoid duplication.

A diagram of the Higher SS and Police Organisation will be found in Appendix "A".

(b) The Regional Organisation of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD

In addition to the various Aussonderungs directly under command of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD two special organizations were introduced. The first was the Gruppe OBERTIROL "EAST" in MILAN which received a status slightly higher than that of an Aussonderungs and which became responsible for all Aussonderungs in North-Western ITALY and for the Grenzbefehlsstelle "WEST". The latter was primarily concerned with frontier control and was responsible for the entire Italian - Swiss border.

The second intermediary organization was that of the Kommandeur der Sipo und des SD in BOZEN. This HQ, apart from being responsible for a number of Aussonderungs in the ALPENVOELAND, was the liaison HQ with the Sipo and SD organizations in GERMANY proper, i.e., in TIROL - VOERARBERG. Source stated that in actual practice this office was often bypassed, particularly in matters concerning the SD only. Not all Aussonderungs had a representative of Abt VI and a special case existed in RACH where Einheit "ID" dealt with all matters affecting Abt VI, remained directly under command of Abt VI and was not responsible to the Aussonderungs in RACH itself.

A diagram of the regional organization of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD will be found in Appendix "B" and a list of subordinate HQs in Appendix "C".

(c) The Functional Organization of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD

The functional organization of the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD is based on the organization of the MIL and will be found in diagrammatic form in Appendix "D".

(d) The Functional Organization of Enemy Prisoners in ITALY

Source stated that after the amalgamation of the Abwehr with the Sipo und SD it was intended to retain the organization of existing Abwehr Kommandos and Abwehr Trupps and to institute a dual chain of command, one leading to the Militaerisches Amt of the MIL and the other to the Ia/Abwehr organization of the military formations concerned. This was found impracticable and in Feb 45 a new system was introduced. Tactical missions (Einsatzaktionen) were to remain the responsibility of Ia/Abwehr at Army Group and the personnel for the espionage units (Frontaufklaerungs Trupps) was to be drawn mainly from I/Heer personnel of the former Abwehr. For strategic missions (Fernaufklaerung) a special representative of the Militaerisches Amt, known as the Militaerisches Amt Fernerstelle ITALIEN, was set up to control long range missions. The personnel for units engaged in this work was intended to be drawn mainly from former Abwehr personnel of I/Luft and I/Marine. Source pointed out that at the time of the surrender of the German Armies in ITALY this process of reorganization had hardly begun and he did not know how far it had already affected the order of battle of known Abwehr

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is regarded as having been in fact GHI and VI Auslani, which was in a rule only designated President VI of the Fed. S. itself or first Bird at "ED". Only in few cases, as a rule, in espionage questions against Southern.

THESE are elements of the situation in the South.

... shall not be a condition of receipt of any system to be  
used by the Government.

The status of the two secret departments in the ASSE (W1/S and W1/C), should not be that of the other person, being responsible for a secret mission, as shown in that by the existence of Frontguardary, Number 111 and the program "TIPPER". The first is subordinate to ASSE Military Section (W1/S), the latter to the ASSE W1/S. Source did not know of any difference in the mission undertaken by either department but stated that they were often discussed as to whether one was subordinate to the other. He believed that in fact both are equal in status.

According to Paragraph VI/2, responsibility for the penetration of Allied intelligence was assigned to the IGSM by Major von KRETZSCHER. Kretzschmer stated that the responsibility for such actions was claimed by the IGSM, which argued that it was primarily a counter-espionage commitment. The latter was, however, active in the following way: penetration missions which involve the crossing of borders into Allied German territory are a responsibility of VI/2. Penetration missions, however, which take place on German Occupied Territory, such as penetration of Russian Organizations, remain a responsibility of the IGSM. In the case of a penetration of some undertaking such an operation of German territory, Paragraph VII/2 is relevant also.

Finally, Source stated that both a battery and penetration combination in T-37 stood outside the normal chain of command and reached directly up to the top of the hierarchy of the RGR.

A Diagram of the Functional Organization of every subparty, and  
constitutive, is: FIRST will be found in Appendix "F".

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1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details

Name	: HUGGEL Dr. Klaus
Alias	: None
Rank	: SS Sturmbannfuhrer
Unit	: Abt VI B.d. S. ITALIEN
Id.No.	: Not known
F.P.No.	: 13563
SS No.	: 111,815
Party No.	: 3,407,445
Home Address	: BREGENZ, Schloss Wolfurt
Captured	: 26 Apr 45 COMO
Secret No.	: 14/45/546
Interrogated	: CSDIC, CMF 5 - 7 May 45

(b) History and Career

(of : CSDIC/CMF/SD/2 para 1 b)

(c) Assessment

(of : CSDIC/CMF/SD/2 para 1 c)

Reliability : Good

(Interrogated by E.E.)

2. POST OCCUPATIONAL PLANS OF THE GIs IN ITALY

(a) Development

The first steps towards organising a post-occupational network in ITALY were taken at end 42, when SS Obersturmfuhrer Dr. GROEBEL was sent to ITALY. At that time by a special order from HITLER all espionage work in ITALY was expressly forbidden and Dr. GROEBEL's function had to be kept from the Italians. Dr. GROEBEL worked under the cover of an employee of one of the German travelling agencies and his task was to organise a post-occupational net in SICILY and CALABRIA. In Aug 43 Source visited ROME as a special representative of Amt VI of the RSHA and was told by Dr. GROEBEL that he had not managed to organise any stay behind nets. Immediately after the Italian Armistice, Dr. GROEBEL was killed by Italian Partisans near ABRATIA.

After the Italian Armistice RSHA policy for ITALY was revised. Until then, ITALY, was handled for the purpose of espionage and sabotage by Amt VI (VI/B) of the RSHA. Now German Occupied ITALY was treated as occupied territory and Amt III of the RSHA took over the responsibilities of obtaining information on internal affairs in Fascist Republican ITALY. Allied Occupied ITALY was treated as "Kosland" and Amt VI and its representatives in ITALY were charged with the conduct of SD espionage and sabotage in this territory and the establishment of post-occupational groups.

Source stated that the SD did not succeed in forming any stay-behind nets before the front in ITALY became stabilized during the late autumn 43, and he had never heard that any groups had been established South of the German "Winter Line".

During the winter 43/44 the Einsatzkommando der Sipo und des SD in ROME, under SS Obersturmbannfuhrer KIEHLER became responsible for the organization of post-occupational plans. The Einsatzkommando was also charged with the conduct of SD - espionage and sabotage missions in Allied Occupied ITALY and these missions were mostly of a purely military character. At that time Amt VI of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in FLORENCE was established. Until the fall of ROME this department did not concern itself with active sabotage and espionage, nor with post-occupational plans, but was engaged in the selection and training of agents and in the obtaining of information from contacts in Fascist Republican circles. According to Source there was a clear cut division of work between the Einsatzkommando ROME and

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Akt VI of the B.d.S. in FLORENCE; Source, who took over his duties as head of Akt VI in FLORENCE in Mar 44, stated that he had insisted at the RSHA that this should be so and that he had told SCHEIDTBERG that he disclaimed any responsibility for the work of Einsatzkommando ROE. Consequently Source knew little as regards the activities of Einsatzkommando ROE in the sphere of post-occupational plans. He believed that apart from stay-behind agents left by KAPFER other agents, probably under the orders of SS Standartenfuhrer Dr. DOLLEMAN might have remained in ROE, but he knew no details.

The post-occupational work of Einsatzkommando ROE was generally regarded as a failure and Source was certain that no information had been forthcoming from any agents left behind in ROE. As regards possible other SD agents, who might have remained in ROE under arrangements of DOLLEMAN or possibly other SD officers, Source emphasized that if such groups or individuals were left behind, little or no information could have been obtained. He stated that he had never seen any reference to or information from such agents and he was sure that such information would have reached him.

As a result of the failure of Einsatzkommando ROE, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer KAPFER was removed from Akt VI activities. SS Sturmbannfuhrer HASS, who had been in charge of Akt VI of the Einsatzkommando ROE, was given another chance and was charged with the organization of post-occupational networks in FLORENCE. Source stated that although by this time post-occupational plans for FLORENCE were his responsibility, HASS was in sole charge of the actual execution of the work, which again proved a failure. Apart from the unsuitability of the human material at HASS's disposal Source explained that this failure was due to the limited time at the disposal of Akt VI to organize the nets. Source was unable to remember exact details and names of the groups which were established in FLORENCE. He stated that three groups were formed, two of which were liquidated by the Allies, allegedly through the betrayal of a woman interpreter and this fact was stated to have become known to the SD. The third group never tried to establish contact and was presumed to have surrendered to the Allies.

After all these failures RSHA insisted on drastic changes. A special representative of the RSHA, SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOLFF, usually known as Dr. WOLFF, was sent to ITALY with the task of organizing post-occupational networks in Northern ITALY. He arrived in Jul 44 and Source formed a group consisting of WOLFF, SS Sonderfuhrer (now SS Untersturmfuhrer) Dr. MEYER, SS Obersturmfuhrer RIED and a civilian named TCHERON, which was given a roving commission.

In Oct 44 Akt VI of the B.d.S. in VERONA sent out instructions to all its representatives at the various Auslenkungsstellen in Northern ITALY to make preparations for stay-behind networks. Those representatives were in most cases only authorized to make tentative selections and the "roving commission" would then visit the place and choose the candidates. The commission also made recommendations as to the proposed set-up of the group and the representative of Akt VI was then left to make the necessary arrangements. The choice of a flat, the moving of furniture, the installing of W/T sets, the contact between members of the group (if necessary) were effected by the Akt VI representative. At the same time a suitable W/T operator was chosen by Akt VI in VERONA and trained at the SD W/T School at VERONA and later at COSSENSE and then allotted to the Group. Source stated that as a rule former Italian Navy and Air Force W/T operators were preferred. After these preparations the "roving commission" usually visited the Group again, checked the W/T link with the RSHA receiving end and was sure that the network was ready to operate. From then on the local representative of Akt VI had only to supervise the activities of the various members of the net, a job which according to Source needed much attention because some agents started black market dealings with the funds entrusted to them or got into trouble with the police and were arrested, others simply abandoned their missions and a few even deserted to the Partisans, once they had been given some money.

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In the case of less important Aussonkommandos it was not always possible for the "roving commission" to make all the arrangements and the local representative of Abt VI was then left in sole charge to install the post-occupational group.

In Dec 44 WOLFF was recalled to GERMANY and from that time Dr. MEYER was in charge of the "roving commission". Since beg 45 the difficulties in maintaining the nets were considerably increased by the fact that, because of the Allied advances, the REKA W/T link was constantly shifted. The link which was originally in BERLIN, was moved to ERLBERG in Jan/Feb 45 and later to KRIEGERAD (KRIEGER LAZNE) in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. These changes necessitated a constant change of crystals of agents' W/T nets and of frequent tests with the new receiving link. Source stated that this work took up a considerable part of the time of his technical personnel, which in turn had the result that only insufficient W/T operators could be trained and proposed nets remained without W/T links.

The German post-occupational network was known under the name of "Invasions Netz" or as it was called later "I" Netz. From this abbreviation sprang the cover name of "IDA" Netz and post-occupational agents were referred to as "IDA" Leute. This would imply that Einheit "IDA" at REKA was also concerned with post-occupational plans. Source stated that this was not so and that although this organisation carried out only active espionage missions, the name was deliberately chosen to mislead Allied Counter Intelligence Agencies.

(b) Post-occupational networks as at Apr 45.

Source was unable to furnish detailed information as regards the details and the state of readiness of post-occupational networks that existed at the time of the surrender of the German Armies in ITALY. Since beg Feb 45 Source was engaged on special duties for SS Obergruppenführer WOLFF and was actually removed from his normal Abt VI duties; he stated furthermore that the actual work in setting up the post-occupational networks was completely in the hands of WOLFF and MEYER and that he concerned himself mainly with the general planning and policy. Source is believed to have told the truth in this report and there is some evidence to support his statements.

Source stated that as a rule post-occupational groups in Northern ITALY were intended to have at least three and at the most seven to eight members. All groups had one W/T operator who was usually equipped with two nets, of which one was a battery set to ensure that he could transmit if the local electricity supply broke down.

As far as Source could remember the following nets were set up:

(i) GENOA

The group consisted of five to six persons. No names were known to Source. To the best of his belief the group was ready to operate.

The following members of the GIS have a detailed knowledge of the group:

SS Sturmbannführer WOLFF  
SS Untersturmbannführer Dr. MEYER  
SS Oberscharführer Ing. GILLEY  
SS Scharführer RUFF  
SS Untersturmbannführer MICHELLE  
SS Sturmbannführer KREIER (?)

(ii) SAN REMO

The group consisted of about 4 - 5 people who were unknown to Source. The group was ready to operate.

The following members of the GIS have a detailed knowledge of the group:

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SS Stabschefkocher WOLFF  
SS Untersturmführer Dr. HÄGER  
SS Oberscharführer Ing. GIFFEY  
SS Scharführer DAFIL  
SS Rottenführer SCHIFFERBOGER

## (iii) ILIAN

Originally a certain "GLOZIELLO" (believed to be an alias) was chosen as an independent stay-behind agent, but he is stated to have withdrawn from the mission because he was afraid. His successor was Frl. WEILMECHER, a secretary of Abt IV of the F.d.S. in VERONA. According to Source she also lost her courage and Source sent her back to BOLZANO to join her fiancée on 20 Apr 45.

Furthermore a cert in "GLOZIELLO" (alias, real name unknown) was intended as a post-occupational agent in ILLAN. Source did not know if and to what extent the stay-behind group in ILLAN had been organized, but he did not believe that preparations had been completed.

The following members of the GIS have a detailed knowledge of post-occupational agents in ILLAN:

SS Hauptsturmführer HÄGER  
SS Untersturmführer Dr. HÄGER  
SS Untersturmführer HEGREY

## (iv) COLO

The head of the stay-behind group is a certain BORGESI. Preparations were not in a very advanced state and the total numbers of agents under BORGESI could not be established. A man called FINIZIO was earmarked but is believed to have deserted to the Partisans. W/T communications had not yet been set up, although W/T sets for the group had arrived in COLO; they were left behind in the W/T of the "Grenzberichtsstelle WEST".

In addition to the BORGESI group an independent agent was recruited. This man, a Sonderführer GESSER, using the alias "CORRADO", was given a free hand to establish his own group in the COLO - ILLAN area. He had penetrated a partisan organization and intended to pass himself off as a partisan. Source suspected him of being a double agent.

## (v) TRIESTE

Source stated that a stay-behind group had been established in TRIESTE and as far as he knew the group was ready to operate. He remembered that a certain DE RIVOLI and a certain RASCHETTI, the latter a former employee of the Hotel "Lindauer" in ROBE, were members of the group.

The following members of the GIS have a detailed knowledge of the net:

SS Untersturmführer WOLF  
SS Obersturmführer RIED  
SS Scharführer BORGESI

## (vi) VERONA

A group, consisting of about 5 members was ready to operate. Source stated that a certain GAZZELLINI was a member and possibly the head of the net.

The following GIS personnel possess a detailed knowledge of the group:

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SS Sturmbannführer WOLFF  
SS Untersturmbannführer RIED  
SS Obersturmbannführer WENDT  
SS Scharführer DORN

(vii) DOLOGH

A net, comprising about eight members was set up by the SD, but Source could remember no names. In addition to this net another net was intended to be set up by the Fascist Republican Part and Abt VI was asked by the Italians to provide the W/T sets. A certain Federico TORRI and a Dr. PAGLINI are stated to possess detailed knowledge of the Italian net.

The following GIS personnel have detailed knowledge of the SD stay-behind group

SS Obersturmbannführer DOLLER  
SS Untersturmbannführer Dr. HILF

(viii) FINSE Area

Source believed that some stay-behind agents were installed in the FINSE area and on the islands of C. E. 130 and C. E. 131. Source claimed to know no details but stated that SS Sturmbannführer WOLFF had travelled in the above mentioned areas with the intention of setting up a net-work.

(c) Objects and Intentions


Source emphasized that all German post-occupational espionage and sabotage plans were based on the assumption that although the Lombardy Plain might have to be evacuated, German troops would continue to resist in the foothills of the Alps and would defend the southern approaches to the Alpine Reibut. Furthermore that it was never thought or officially conceived that GERMANY would lose the war or at least that the end of the war would come in such a way as has actually happened. According to Source, this view prevailed in the highest German circles. Those people who did have a clear view of the situation and realized the impending dangers never dared to state such views frankly and to suggest the preparation of measures which should be taken after the defeat of GERMANY. All such suggestions were branded as defeatism. Source stated that the temporary loss of certain German territories was of course expected and it was for this purpose that the WERWOLF Organisation was created. Apart from impeding the Allied occupation by acts of sabotage, it was hoped that the WERWOLF Organisation could terrorize the population of Allied occupied German areas so as to prevent collaboration and the setting up of a rival German administration. All this, however, was based on the assumption of an eventual re-taking of such regions and a come-back of the Nazi Government.

Even high ranking German officers and officials had no clear view how Allied military superiority could be checked and the loss of the war averted, though their faith was not greatly affected by this. The vague belief in eventual German victory was mainly based on two ideas: in the military sphere on the arrival of new secret weapons and in the political sphere on the hope that a split would occur between BRITAIN and AMERICA on one side and RUSSIA on the other.

To the latter end German post-occupational espionage plans were subordinated and also during the last six months political espionage in ITALY was also directed with this end in view.

At a conference at the RWL which took place in REGEN in May 44, HITLER and KALTENBUNNER had explained to Source the importance of the Italian theatre for the purpose of political espionage. They declared that because of the composition of the Allied armies in ITALY, any differences

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between individual member countries of the United Nations would soon be apparent in the various expeditionary forces. Next in importance was the Italian Government which in itself did not interest the RLL, but which was regarded as a "mirror" which reflected political trends and the political influence of the Allies. Political missions, therefore, were designed to provide information on Anglo-American influence, on Russian influence, and on the influence of the VATICAN. Source was instructed to brief his political agents to obtain information on the principal causes of dissention between the Allies and of the principal causes of discontent on the part of the Italians. The black market was considered an important target which would offer German propaganda and agents provocateurs a fertile ground.

In view of this policy post-occupational agents in Northern ITALY were briefed to infiltrate into anti-Fascist Italian parties and then to report on the intentions of these parties and their successes and failures. It was also hoped that if an agent had successfully established his anti-Fascist and anti-German views, that he would at a later date receive instructions how to act to increase rifts and causes of dissention. Such activity, although envisaged, had not yet been planned in detail and Source could provide no information as to the methods that were to be adopted.

It should be noted that the policy as described above visualized the continued existence of a German Nazi Government and the continuation of the war. Source was carefully questioned as to whether any preparations had been made for the possibility of complete military defeat and collapse of the Nazi regime. He stated emphatically that he did not know of any plans to this effect and he believed that if such plans had been made he would have certainly had some indication of their existence. He quoted a few examples to show that high leaders in the Nazi hierarchy did not reckon with the complete defeat of GERMANY and the plans for the withdrawal of enemy intelligence organizations in ITALY to a small extent tend to confirm this.

A substantial part of the offices of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD had already been evacuated to COSSERIESS and it was intended that eventually the whole HQ should move there. The Staff of the H.Q.S., however, was to go to BOLZANO and liaison officers had already been selected to operate between BOLZANO and COSSERIESS. Binnet "ID." was to go to ROVERETO and to continue to send agents into Allied Occupied ITALY. Unternehmen "GIPFELS" was to withdraw to GIPFEL. At least some of the surplus personnel from vacated HQs in Northern ITALY were to be deployed along the German-Swiss Frontier in VERONESE from where an increased number of agents was to be launched.

Source stated that no post-occupational acts were prepared in the ALPENVORLAND or even in TEROL-VOERLAND and there was no stay-behind group in VERONESE.

Summing up Source emphasized that such post-occupational plans as had been prepared in Northern ITALY had no connection with any possible plans for political survival or resurrection of the Nazi Party. Since these plans were always based on the belief that at least in some parts of GERMANY the Nazi Government would continue the struggle, he thought that post-occupational agents, if not denounced by native GIB personnel, will voluntarily abandon their missions.

Although Source has been extremely cooperative and as far as could be checked truthful in his statements, his information as regards post-occupational policy and the possibility of Nazi revival plans should be treated with reserve. His veracity on this point is as yet impossible to establish and it is not impossible that such plans may have been planned outside the sphere of Act VI.

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5. PERSONALITIES

Note : Personal details of German personalities mentioned in this report have been omitted and will be published in a subsequent report.

(a) Italian Agents

SECRET

Lieutenant in the Italian Army. Political agent of Lt VI D.A.S. VERONA.

Age about 25, single.

About 1.75m tall, slim, oval face, dark hair, small mustache.

Record : Carried out a political mission in ROME in Oct 44 and returned to BOY in Dec 44. Was to be parachuted into the RUE area on another mission at beg. Apr 45, but Source doubts whether this was carried out. Was at one time suspected of having been played back into BOY by Allied Intelligence Service.

Private address : BENEVOLO.

(VERONA - 6 Apr 45)

(b) Italian Informers

SECRET

Informer working for the Grenzbeobachtungsstelle WEST.

Age about 50, married.

About 1.60m tall, stocky build, round face, grey hair, clean shaven.

Record : Former SM agent. Informed on subversive activities and Partisans. Maintained contact with smugglers for the purpose of passing agents into SWITZERLAND.

Private address : VENEZIA

(VENEZIA - Apr 45)

Comment : Confirmed by Hauptsturmführer CLEGGIS, Lt VI representative at Grenzbeobachtungsstelle WEST. See separate report.

Well-known informer and recruiter of agents, working primarily for Einheit "ID".

Record : Carried out a political mission in BOLOGNA in summer 44. Obtained political information on Allied Occupied ITALY from Conte GALLI, a former member of the first MODOGLIO Cabinet, now living in VENEZIA.

GALLI was reported to have maintained his own channel of communication with the MODOGLIO and BONCHI Governments, but to have been unaware that BONCHI had passed his information on to the ~~Waffen~~ ~~SS~~ ~~GIS~~.

(1st report)

(VENEZIA - Apr 45)

FREDELUZZI Conte

11-17-64

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CSDIC/CIF/SD/3

(c) Recruiters and Collaborators

~~MASSI Marzio~~  
CIT. 5:27

(Lieut. Colonel) Well-known personality.  
Record: Former editor of the "STAMP",  
responsible for fascist propa-  
ganda in OT. Recruited agents  
for the SD. (German. & S. & P. & H.)

2 (COMO - 20 Apr 45)

MLT

Ident. Colonel. Well-known personality.  
Record: Born in SUDDEL. Was in SPAIN  
and FRANCE. Recruited agents and  
intended to set up his own post-  
occupational networks with himself  
as the head. Considered by Source  
to be clever and capable, but  
unbalanced.  
Address: LINO (Province P.DOV.)

(LINO - Apr 45)

MEGRONI

Well-known personality.  
Record: Formerly employed by the Einsatz  
kommando ROME. Then recruiter  
for Unternehmen "CYPRUSSE". Since  
Mar 45 working for Einheit "Ida".

(P.M. - Apr 45)

(d) Post-occupational agents

~~MESINI Dino~~  
DOB: 10-5  
CIT. 1463

Age about 40,  
about 1.80m tall, strong build, round face,  
brown hair, blue eyes, thick lips.  
Record: Former hotel waiter, speaks German  
and English. Native of the SONDRIO  
district. SD agent in COMO. PRAXIAN HAD  
Possibly with a post-occupational  
mission. Lived in CERNOBIO with (P. R. R.)  
an unknown German woman who arrived  
there beg Apr 45. Left CERNOBIO  
on a bicycle on 24 Apr 45 travelling  
South, but the woman stayed.

Private address: CERNOBIO

1 (CERNOBIO - 24 Apr 45)

Comment: Confirmed by Hauptsturmfuehrer  
CLEGENS.


BORGESI alias FISCHER

Age about 50, married, one son.  
About 1.70m tall, corpulent, round full  
face, pale complexion, dark thin hair,  
hooked nose.  
Record: Former SD agent and black  
marketeer. Head of a post-  
occupational network in COMO.  
Private address: Albergo Paradiso,  
S.N. MURIZIO near MILAN.

(CERNOBIO - 23 Apr 45)

Comment: Confirmed by Hauptsturmfuehrer  
CLEGENS.

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TOP SECRET

CSDIC/CIF/SD/3

CASAR alias CORRADO

Sonderführer, German. Book illustrator.  
Age about 43, married, no children.  
About 1.70m tall, slim, large head, long  
face, pock marks, thick grey hair, large  
wart on left cheek.  
Record : Independent post-occupational  
agent who was to operate in the  
MILAN and COMO area.  
Private address : VERGOGIO nr VARESE.

(CORRADO - 27 Apr 45)

Comment : Confirmed by Hauptsturmführer  
GIERIS.

C.R. TERZO  
(Since arrested)

Age about 45, single  
About 1.70m tall, slim, oval face, dark  
hair, clean shaven.  
Record : Former Italian Air Force W/T  
operator. Trained by the GIS  
in VERONA. Left behind in BOLOGNA  
as W/T operator of a post-  
occupational group.  
Private address : BOLOGNA.

DE PIETRE

Age about 45, married.  
About 1.65m tall, stocky build, round face,  
dark hair, clean shaven.  
Record : Believed to have had previous  
connections with the GIS in GROSSE.  
Thought to be a member of a post-  
occupational group in TRIESTE.  
Private address : GENOA.  
(Cf. CSDIC/CIF/2 112)

FR. SIHETTI

Age about 45,  
No description available.  
Record : Former employee of the Hotel  
"EXCELSIOR" in ROVERETO. Earnmarked  
as post-occupational agent in  
TRIESTE.

G. L. SIHETTI

No description available.  
Record : Earnmarked as W/T operator for  
a post-occupational net in  
VENICE.

(c) German Personalities

BOERKE

SS Scharführer  
Movements as for Dr. MEYER (see below)

D. H. L.

SS Scharführer  
Last seen in BERLIN, beg Apr 45.

ENGEL

SS Sturmbannführer  
Last heard of in GENOA, beg Apr 45.

GIFFEY

SS Oberscharführer  
Left on 2 Apr 45 for BERLIN and had not  
returned to ITALY by 23 Apr 45.

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TOP SECRET

CSDIC/CLF/SD/3

KLSS	SS Sturmbannfuhrer Last heard of in P.R. bog Apr 45
KAPPLER	SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Last heard of in P.R. NO 16 Apr 45
KAYER Dr.	SS Untersturmbannfuhrer. Was on 5 Apr 45 in VERONA and left the following day in company with SS Scharfuhrer DORR for P.R. to meet Lt.Col. F.M.U. Was expected at COMD on 20 Apr 45 but did not arrive.
NICHOLSEN	SS Untersturmbannfuhrer Last heard of in VERONA bog Apr 45.
MOELLER	SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Last heard of in BOLOGNA bog Apr 45.
SCHIFFENBERGER	SS Rottenfuhrer Last heard of at S.F. AND bog Apr 45.
WILLMEYER Prl.	Secretary of Abt IV F.C.S. Went to BOLOGNA on or about 20 Apr 45.
WESST	SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Last seen in VERONA bog Apr 45.
WOLF	SS Untersturmbannfuhrer Last heard of at TRIESTE bog Apr 45
WOLFF	SS Sturmbannfuhrer. Left ITALY for GERMANY in Dec 44.
ANDER	SS Hauptsturmbannfuhrer. Believed to be in SWITZERLAND

SECRET

CSDIC/CLF/SD

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